During continued disposition hearings, K. The court of appeal agreed and denied K. The Supreme Court reversed, holding 1 the plain and original understanding of Arbuckle is that in every plea in both adult and juvenile court, an implied term is that the judge who accepts the plea will be the judge who pronounces sentence; and 2 should the People wish to allow a different judge to preside at sentencing, or, in juvenile cases, disposition, they should seek to obtain a waiver from the pleading defendant or juvenile.
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Opinion Annotation. Download PDF. Hospital staff also recommended David B. He was unable to provide consistent information about his medical or personal history. The social worker had spoken with a representative of the county health services department, who identified a respite center that was able to accept David B. The program works with young adults, has medical staff on hand five days a week, and works closely with the homeless shelter where David B.
The Bureau stated in its report that David B. He also declined to meet with the social worker when she tried to visit him at the hospital on October 7. The Bureau also stated much of the information David B. The family members the Bureau had been able to contact had not been willing to provide much information. The Bureau stated that, due to David B. The Bureau stated it intended to continue to coordinate and secure appropriate services for David B. At the October 14, hearing, the court stated it had reviewed the Bureau's reports.
The court admitted into evidence a letter from David B. The court denied this request, stating that it needed to be able to see a witness to evaluate his or her demeanor when testifying. The court, however, permitted David B. He began living with his older brother, sometimes on the streets. He had been shot several times. He expressed interest in pursuing a high school diploma and vocational training, and stated he needed help with his health, education and housing. Noting the Bureau's unsuccessful efforts to locate David B.
Counsel argued that, in this context, the Bureau's assertion that David B. Counsel also suggested that, as an alternative to section , subdivision g , David B. Counsel for the Bureau argued for dismissal, contending that the information provided by David B. The court dismissed the petition. The court stated it had carefully reviewed the evidence and concluded it did not show David B.
The court found that David B. He was not abandoned. The court concluded there was not sufficient evidence to support a finding that David B. The court encouraged the Bureau to follow through on its promise to assist David B. In response, the Bureau contends 1 the appeal is moot because David B. As we shall explain, we conclude the appeal is moot. The Bureau contends this appeal is moot because David B. The juvenile court is a court of limited jurisdiction. Rules of Court, rule 5. See In re Candida S. Decisions by the Courts of Appeal support the Bureau's position that a juvenile court may not make an initial adjudication of dependency for a person who is over age In In re Gloria J.
Gloria J. In Gloria J. At the jurisdiction hearing, which ultimately was held after Gloria J. On appeal from the subsequent disposition order, the Court of Appeal reversed and ordered the petition dismissed.
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The Gloria J. The first time the [juvenile] court was called upon to determine the question of its jurisdiction, Gloria J. Clearly, the court had no jurisdiction over Gloria J. In subsequent decisions, the Courts of Appeal have adhered to this distinction, stating a juvenile court may not initiate dependency jurisdiction over a person if he or she is 18 years of age or older, while noting that once a juvenile court has obtained jurisdiction of a minor it may retain jurisdiction until he or she reaches age The language of former section , relied on by the Gloria J.
The definitions in section do not apply to terms used in section or related statutes. But see In re K. Second, it is well-recognized that what the Bureau portrays as a bright-line cut-off at age 18 has exceptions that, in some circumstances, potentially extend the dependency age cut-off to age In In re K. When various provisions describing nonminor dependency jurisdiction for persons over age 18 are read in context, it seems plain that this particular form of dependency jurisdiction is merely derivative of jurisdiction assumed earlier, prior to age As we read it, the statutory scheme reflects a clear recognition by the Legislature that, while dependency jurisdiction may continue to age 21, it must be initiated before age The statutory scheme governing nonminor dependents also makes clear that persons over age 18 are adults, even if they fall within the juvenile court's continuing dependency jurisdiction.
A nonminor dependent shall retain all of his or her legal decisionmaking authority as an adult. Holly H. While the Legislature has sought to facilitate the transition to adulthood of persons who entered the dependency system before age 18, there is no indication the Legislature contemplated or authorized the initiation of dependency jurisdiction over adults.
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Because the juvenile court cannot initiate dependency jurisdiction over David B. As noted, the court found at the October jurisdictional hearing that David B. If we were to find the court erred in finding David B. In short, we cannot direct the juvenile court to take an action that is beyond the scope of its legislatively-conferred power. In addressing mootness in their briefs, and in response to our request that the parties focus their attention at oral argument on the issue of mootness, David B.
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They contend, however, that David B. We are not persuaded we can order entry of a finding David B. Amicus curiae also argues we can direct the trial court to assume jurisdiction over David B. This argument confuses the power of nunc pro tunc correction with the power of appellate review.
The nunc pro tunc doctrine does not authorize the retroactive replacement of the juvenile court's order finding David B. See Hamilton v. Laine 57 Cal. An order made nunc pro tunc should correct clerical error by placing on the record what was actually decided by the court but was incorrectly recorded. Finally, amicus curiae notes that, when a juvenile court has assumed jurisdiction over a person, the person's 18th birthday does not divest the court of jurisdiction and does not necessarily render moot an appeal from an order entered in the dependency proceedings.
Here, the court never assumed jurisdiction over David B. Ruth M.
In that case, four minor siblings were made dependents of the juvenile court; at a permanency planning hearing, the juvenile court ordered a plan of long-term foster care; and the children's mother appealed. The court also cited section , providing a juvenile court may retain jurisdiction over a dependent child until he or she reaches age As a general matter, we do not disagree with the statement in Ruth M.
But as we have discussed, since the juvenile court here unlike the juvenile court in Ruth M.
Since we cannot grant effective relief, the appeal is moot. To the extent we have discretion to resolve issues presented in this appeal despite our inability to grant relief to David B. Since David B. See id. Amicus curiae argues that the juvenile court's acceptance of the Bureau's contention that David B. We note there are differences in the phrasing used by courts to describe this and a related exception to mootness, with varying degrees of emphasis on the importance of the issue presented and the likelihood that it will recur.
Department of Corrections 25 Cal. Another version of the rule may be found in decisions focusing primarily on the importance of the issue presented e. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist. Charter High School v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist.
Despite the nuanced variation in these articulations of when an appellate court may proceed to decide an otherwise moot appeal, the common thread running through the cases is that doing so is appropriate only if a ruling on the merits will affect future proceedings between the parties or will have some precedential consequence in future litigation generally. See In re William M.
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That standard is not met here. We do not doubt that the issue of youth homelessness is a matter of broad public importance that might well justify invoking a discretionary exception to mootness in the proper circumstances, but this is not that case. At bottom, David B. We see no basis for exercising discretion to address the fact-specific questions whether David B. See In re M. City of San Jose Cal. While nothing can be done for David B. That need not always be the last word.
Review by writ petition seeking peremptory relief may in some circumstances permit appellate review in the narrow window of time that such cases will often require.
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